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ABSTRACT 
Sudden Stops are associated with increased volatility in relative prices.  We introduce a model based 
on information acquisition to rationalize this increased volatility.  An empirical analysis of the 
conditional variance of the wholesale price to consumer price ratio using panel ARCH techniques 
confirms the relevance of Sudden Stops and potential balance-sheet effects as key determinants of 
relative-price volatility, where balance-sheet effects are captured by the interaction of a proxy for 
potential changes in the real exchange rate (linked to the degree of external leverage of the 
absorption of tradable goods) and a measure of domestic liability dollarization. 
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 I.  Introduction 
 
The succession of financial crises in Emerging Market economies (EMs) that 
materialized throughout the second half of the 1990s,
1 affecting a wide range of countries 
in terms of standard fundamentals in a relatively short time span, suggests that systemic 
financial market forces, coupled with specific country vulnerabilities to capital account 
shocks, lie at the heart of these developments. 
The vast literature on contagion in capital markets that emerged following these 
events acknowledges the existence of systemic effects (or “excess” volatility in spreads 
and asset prices), and it attempts to identify underlying characteristics that work as 
coordination factors.  For example, contagion between two countries could be due to the 
fact that they belong to a particular asset class (Rigobón (2001)), borrow from the same 
banks (van Rijckeghen and Weder (2000)), or share a set of overexposed mutual funds 
(Broner and Gelos (2003)).  Inspired by the Russian crisis of 1998, Calvo (1999) provides 
a model for contagion based on liquidity shocks to international investors, triggered by 
developments in a particular country that spread to other countries as international 
investors sell other assets in their portfolio to restore liquidity. 
As a result of contagion, EMs have been subject to large and unexpected falls in 
capital inflows, or Sudden Stops.  Although the origins of Sudden Stops (or “incipient” 
Sudden Stops) typically reflect systemic shocks to capital markets, the probability that a 
particular country will experience a full-fledged Sudden Stop with large capital flow 
reversals could still depend on domestic factors representing vulnerabilities to this 
external shock.  That is, the probability of experiencing a full-fledged Sudden Stop, 
                                                 
1  Starting with the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the subsequent crises in East Asia (1997), 
Russia (1998), and Latin America (1999-2001).  
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conditional on the materialization of an “incipient” Sudden Stop could be a function of 
domestic factors. 
As established in Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), potential balance-sheet 
effects are key domestic drivers of the probability of experiencing a Sudden Stop.  This is 
mainly due to the fact that Sudden Stops may entail a dramatic change in the level of the 
real exchange rate (RER).  Abstracting from supply-side effects, this is simply the 
corollary of a cut in current account financing that forces a fall in aggregate demand, 
which, in turn, induces a drop in the price of non-tradable goods relative to that of 
tradable goods,
2 so that the RER (defined as the inverse of this relative price) will rise.  
This change-in-level effect in the RER becomes larger the less open a country is (i.e., the 
smaller the supply of tradable goods,
3 and given supply elasticities), as less tradable 
resources will be available to cushion the impact of the cut in foreign financing (see 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) for details). EMs may find RER fluctuations quite 
challenging to deal with when their financial systems are dollarized, especially if 
domestic banks lend to non-tradable sectors in foreign currency.
4  Thus, this phenomenon 
that we will refer to as Domestic Liability Dollarization (DLD) is particularly treacherous 
because Sudden Stops and subsequent RER swings could trigger major uncertainty about 
the solvency of the banking system as loans become non-performing, sometimes leading 
to bank runs, which almost inevitably affect the payments system and cause disruption in 
transactions and output.  Thus, the combination of large potential RER fluctuations and 
                                                 
2 Taking the foreign exchange price of tradable goods as given (the standard assumption for a 
small open economy), all the effect goes through the foreign exchange price of non-tradables. 
3 Relative to the absorption of tradable goods. 
4 See Schmukler and de la Torre (2004) for a discussion on why banks may have a preference for 
default risk over exchange rate risk.  
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DLD could prove deadly, as balance-sheet effects kick in and bring about a major 
shakeup of the domestic banking system.  
  Building on Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), we focus on another (but related) 
angle of Sudden Stops, namely, the issue of short-term relative price volatility (such as 
that of the wholesale price index (WPI) to consumer price index (CPI) ratio) and its 
determinants, with particular emphasis on the impact of balance-sheet effects under 
Sudden Stop episodes.   We care about volatility because when firms are debt-ridden (as 
is likely to be the case after a capital flow episode) and financial markets do not have 
access to contingent contracts, relative-price volatility may bring about financial havoc.  
The reason we believe that balance sheet effects may have an impact on relative price 
volatility is that the former, by affecting the probability of a Sudden Stop, may lead to 
higher volatility in aggregate demand. 
Related empirical work, such as that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001) deals with 
the behavior of the conditional volatility of high frequency
5 nominal exchange rate and 
asset price returns at the country level, and notes that there are periods of global turmoil, 
where the materialization of spikes in volatility tend to coincide across countries.  
Hausmann et al (2004) focus instead on the long-run volatility of the real effective 
exchange rate in an effort to explain differences in the conditional variance of changes in 
the RER between developing and developed countries.  They establish that there is 
indeed a difference in the persistence of the conditional variance process between 
developed and developing countries, but no major factor affects the conditional variance 
of changes in the RER other than perhaps the size of terms of trade shocks.   
                                                 
5 Using daily data.  
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Our approach is different in that it focuses on the behavior of the WPI to CPI ratio 
instead of measures of the bilateral or multilateral RER, and it explores the effects of 
Sudden Stops and balance sheet effects on the conditional variance of this ratio
6.  This 
relative price has not been as extensively studied as the RER, and, yet, there may be 
grounds to believe that it may better capture the domestic behavior of the price of 
tradables vis-à-vis that of non-tradables following Sudden Stop events and devaluation.  
For example, Burnstein et al (2003) find that during crises, the retail price of tradable 
goods moves much less than the “at dock” price of imports and exports, which tend to 
follow nominal exchange rate movements more closely.  This is due to the fact that many 
tradable goods require the use of non-tradable inputs before they reach the retail market, 
and, thus, their retail price reflects a non-tradable component.  Therefore, the WPI, which 
typically has a sizeable tradable component, may capture more appropriately the behavior 
of the retail price of tradable goods than the nominal exchange rate.  This may be 
important when analyzing balance-sheet factors because if the domestic price of tradable 
goods does not track the nominal exchange rate one to one in times of crisis, even 
tradable sectors may experience problems in a context of high liability dollarization.  
  A key question that we ask is how Sudden Stops and balance-sheet factors affect 
the volatility of relative prices.  Even though it is clear that Sudden Stops involve major 
changes in the level of the RER, it is not as clear how the disruption created by Sudden 
Stops may introduce increased volatility in relative prices.  We propose a model where 
information plays a key role in determining relative price volatility.  Sudden Stops 
                                                 
6 The WPI to CPI ratio basically captures a relative price between goods (many of which are 
tradable, and a substantial component of the WPI) and services (most of which are non-tradable, 
and a major component of the CPI).  Moreover, the basket of goods represented by the WPI may 
be deemed more relevant for this analysis than that of the CPI of external partners typically used 
when measuring the real exchange rate.  
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typically coincide with an increase in systemic risk, which is mirrored by a bigger 
correlation of investment projects and a consequent increase in the variance of investment 
portfolios.  This increased variance provides an incentive for investors to acquire 
additional information about investment projects, an action that leads to a larger response 
from investors to shocks, which, in turn, introduces more volatility in aggregate demand 
and in relative prices.  This framework provides a rationale for the observed relationship 
between Sudden Stops and increased relative price volatility that is supported by our 
empirical findings.  In a similar fashion, an increase in potential balance-sheet effects due 
to higher potential changes in the real exchange rate (were a Sudden Stop to materialize) 
may also provide incentives for investors to acquire additional information, thus 
introducing further volatility in relative prices. 
Casual empirical observation reveals that more than half of Sudden Stops in EMs 
are associated with spikes in volatility of the WPI to CPI ratio (measured as a substantial 
increase in the conditional variance of an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) specification). This suggests that major relative price turbulence is a key 
characteristic of Sudden Stop phenomena.  Additionally, while close to half of the 
volatility spikes in the WPI/CPI ratio in EMs coincide with Sudden Stops, only nine 
percent of these spikes occur during Sudden Stop phases in developed countries, 
suggesting that Sudden Stops are not a relevant source of relative price volatility for the 
latter group, but are a factor to consider for EMs.  
We test these results formally by estimating a panel ARCH model of the cyclical 
component of the WPI to CPI ratio, and find that Sudden Stops do increase the 
conditional variance of this ratio.  Balance–sheet factors, captured by a measure of  
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potential changes in the RER, coupled with a measure of domestic liability dollarization 
are also robust across specifications in explaining increases in the conditional variance.    
 
II.  Sudden Stops and Relative Price Volatility: A Simple Model 
Sudden Stop has become one of the focal points of recent theoretical and 
empirical analyses of EMs.  However, Sudden Stop theory has almost exclusively dealt 
with level effects, as opposed to volatility effects. The next section will show some 
striking empirical results about volatility and its relationship with Sudden Stop crises and 
balance-sheet mismatches.  However, these results are hard to interpret without some 
theoretical background.  This motivates the present section.  
  Second moments are hard to model.  Propositions that sound intuitively plausible, 
and thus general, appear to require very specific assumptions.  A prominent example in 
the volatility literature is Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) (GS).  GS addresses a situation in 
which investors have to choose between a safe and a risky asset.  Investors are either 
Informed or Uninformed.  The former have some knowledge about the current realization 
of the risky asset’s return, while the Uninformed have none (they only know ex ante 
distributions).  Thus, the Uninformed base their inference on ex ante information and any 
thread that they can pull from market prices.  The Uninformed can become Informed by 
paying a fixed cost.  In order to obtain reduced forms and be able to characterize 
equilibrium, GS assumes that the utility function belongs to the Constant Absolute Risk 
Aversion family, and that random shocks are normally distributed.  Under those 
conditions, GS is able to prove the following two eminently plausible propositions: (a) 
the volatility of the risky asset’s price increases with the volatility of underlying returns  
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and informational noise, and (b) the larger the variance of the underlying return and 
informational noise, the larger will be the share of the Informed.  Moreover, (c) price 
volatility increases with the share of the Informed.  The latter is an important insight that 
may require some discussion to appreciate its intuitive appeal.   
Consider first the case in which there are no informed investors and, thus, market 
prices are dictated by ex ante information.  Hence, today’s risky-asset price is hit by no 
random shock and is, consequently, completely stable.  In contrast, consider the case in 
which everyone is Informed.  Clearly, under these circumstances there will be 
information that will filter into the current risky asset’s price, increasing its volatility.  
That the share of informed investors translates into higher price volatility in a monotonic 
fashion is, however, a result of the special assumptions in GS, but its intuitive plausibility 
is hard to question. 
  GS lends itself to a reinterpretation for the case at hand.  Thus, for instance, one 
could associate a Sudden Stop with an increase in the noise factor in GS, which implies 
higher price volatility for two reasons: (a) larger underlying volatility (this is a direct 
effect), that (b) induces agents to acquire better information, giving rise to larger price 
volatility.  In addition, the size of the price shock should also be a factor in explaining 
price volatility on the basis of the following consideration.  Price shocks contain 
idiosyncratic and systemic components, which are not individually observable.  Thus, 
investors face a “signal extraction” problem and, as a general rule, will attach some 
probability that part of the shock is caused by systemic shocks
7.  Moreover, systemic 
shocks increase the ex ante correlation among risky assets.  Thus, if the model’s risky 
asset is thought of as a “minimum variance” mutual fund of a variety or risky assets, its 
                                                 
7 For example, see Calvo (1999).  
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volatility will increase.  Thus, the larger the observable shock, the higher is the ex ante 
volatility of the risky asset’s price (again based on higher underlying return volatility and 
incentives for acquiring better information on the part of investors). 
  Above considerations provide some basis for an ARCH specification for price 
volatility.  Moreover, this reinterpretation of GS rationalizes the possibility that variables 
like balance-sheet currency mismatch and current account deficit (as a share of the 
absorption of tradables)—highlighted in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004)—could also 
enter as explanatory variables in the ARCH model.  This is so because the larger are the 
latter two variables, the larger is the probability of Sudden Stop and, hence, the larger the 
probability that asset prices will become more volatile because of possibly larger 
informational noise, leading to the acquisition of better information and, according to GS, 
greater volatility.  The empirical analysis will focus on the ratio of wholesale to consumer 
price levels, some kind of “domestic” real exchange rate.  We focus on this variable 
because it comes closer to a relative price between goods and services than any of the 
standard measures of real exchange rate.  However, this relative price is not the price of 
an asset.  GS, thus, helps to get some intuition about factors that affect price volatility but 
leaves us somewhere halfway from where we need to go.
8  This is the motivation for 
developing the next simple model, where variables are closer to the ones that will be 
subject to empirical analysis.  Moreover, the model will be much simpler than GS, which 
will help better to understand the basic economics of information and price volatility. 
A Simple Model of Price Variability.  Let us assume that the economy is populated by 
identical competitive firms producing tradables.  Each firm is owned by one entrepreneur 
                                                 
8 Halfway because, for example, the risky asset could be thought as a bundle of different land 
plots, subject to a stochastic return.  Thus, the price of the risky asset would correspond to a price 
index of land, a nontradable, in terms of the safe asset, a tradable.  
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whose labor services are fixed and normalized to 1.   Output of tradables is produced by 
means of capital (a tradable) and entrepreneurial labor services (a non-tradable) under 
constant returns to scale.  Let k denote the capital-(entrepreneurial) labor ratio, and θ a 
random variable with positive variance, which affects the marginal productivity of 





k k f − =θ θ       ( 1 )  
Moreover, static quasi-rent per unit of (entrepreneurial) labor, given k and θ, π(k,θ), 
satisfies: 
, ) , ( ) , ( rk k f k − = θ θ π       ( 2 )  
where r is the exogenous international interest rate in terms of tradables (or the capital 
rental).   
  Consider first the case of the Uninformed who have to choose the level of capital 
before the state of nature is revealed.  The Uninformed know the ex ante distribution of 
random variable θ, the international interest rate r and, of course, his/her production 
function.  We assume that investors are risk neutral.  Thus, the Uninformed will choose 







k k E − − =θ θ π       ( 3 )  
where  , θ θ E ≡  i.e., the unconditional expectation of θ.  Thus, the first-order condition 
satisfies:
9 
. r k − =θ        ( 4 )  
                                                 
9 In what follows, we will focus on interior solutions.  
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Thus, the Uninformed choose k independently of the realization of random shock θ, and 
optimal k declines with the international interest rate r, as expected.  Plugging equation 
(4) into expression (3) we get the value of expected quasi-rents from the perspective of 
Uninformed investors.  We denote it by π
U.  Hence, 
2
) ( 2 r U −
=
θ
π        ( 5 )  
Consider now the case of the (perfectly) Informed investor, who is able to 
pinpoint exactly the realization of random variable θ.  Thus, the first-order condition with 
respect to k yields: 
. r k − =θ        ( 6 )  
Hence, equation (6) says that the profit-maximizing k increases with random shock θ and 
decreases with the international rate of interest r, as expected. 
Denoting quasi-rents of the Informed investor conditional on θ by π 
I(θ), it readily 
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=      (8) 
Therefore, expected quasi-rents of the Informed exceed that of the Uninformed.  Thus, if 
the cost of acquiring information is, say, a positive constant σ, then everybody will 
become informed if var θ > 2σ, while nobody will invest in information if var θ < 2σ.   
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This result is in line with GS.  However, except in the borderline case in which var θ = 2 
σ, all investors are either Informed or Uninformed.
 10   
  Let us now turn to relative prices.  Recalling equations (1), (2) and (4), if all 
investors are Uninformed the (implicit) real entrepreneurial wage or income in terms of 





r − − −
θ
θ θ       (9) 
On the other hand, if all investors are informed, the real entrepreneurial wage is, by (1), 




) ( 2 r − θ       (10) 
It can be shown that when θ  has a uniform distribution, the variance of the real wage is 
more volatile under informed investors (see Technical Appendix I).
11 
  An interesting implication of this example is that, even though increases in the 
variance of θ  will, in general, affect the return to (entrepreneurial) labor—both for 
informed or uninformed investors—the effect of this increase will be bigger when 
investors are informed than when they are uninformed.  In the present model, the key 
channel establishing a connection between the variability of θ  and that of the real wage 
is the possibility that investors decide to get better informed.  This is the channel that we 
wish to emphasize.  First, because it is lesser known.  But, second and more important, 
because we sense that a major phenomenon that takes place after a Sudden Stop is that 
individuals have strong incentives to spend more time assessing the situation.  This 
                                                 
10 The model could be extended to the case in which individuals face different costs of acquiring 
information.  In this fashion, one could replicate GS’s result that there exists a robust set of cases 
in which Informed and Uninformed investors coexist. 
11 This result also extends to the family of log-normal distributions.  
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entails looking at variables that would be irrelevant in normal times (e.g., the credit 
network in which debtors are inserted: are there massive bankruptcies which threaten the 
ability of clients to repay their debts, etc?).  The resulting greater attention to details on 
the part of entrepreneurs likely slows down the production process bringing about a 
negative level effect on output.  But, in addition, and in line with our example, more 
detailed information results in greater volatility of investment decisions, thus imparting 
greater volatility on relative prices, specifically the real entrepreneurial wage (which in 
our example could be identified with the ratio of the WPI to CPI). 
  This framework clearly shows that better information leads to higher relative 
price volatility.  However, better information by itself may not be welfare-reducing if it 
leads to better decision-making on the part of firms.   The reason we care about volatility 
is that when firms are debt-ridden (as is likely to be the case after a capital flow episode) 
and financial markets do not have access to contingent contracts, relative-price volatility 
may bring about financial havoc that more than offsets the beneficial effects of better 
information.  This could be particularly true in a context of high Domestic Liability 
Dollarization, where higher relative-price variance will increase the likelihood of 
rendering firms bankrupt.` 
Thus far, we have assumed that investors can have full or no information.  
However, this model can be extended in interesting ways by assuming that investors 
could acquire information of different qualities.  Consider a simple example in which 
variable θ can take values in the interval [a,b].  No information means that investors only 
know the ex ante distribution of θ, while perfect information means that prior to choosing 
k investors know θ with perfect certainty.  Let us imagine an intermediate case in which  
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b a  but nothing 
else.  Assuming that the underlying distribution for θ  remains invariant, one can show 
that expected quasi-rents under the intermediate case are larger than under no information 
and smaller than under full information.  This follows from our discussion above, which 
shows that larger variance of the conditional mean of θ (conditional on the interval in 
which θ  falls) upon which investors could react because the information is available to 
them, leads to higher expected quasi-rents (recall expression (8)).  Moreover, one can 
show that further information refinements of the sort discussed here are associated with 
larger variance of the conditional mean
12. 
Figure 1 depicts information equilibrium determination.  On the horizontal axis 
we depict information quality (quality improves as numbers get larger).  On the vertical 
axis we depict marginal cost and benefit of information.  Equilibrium obtains at point A 
where marginal cost equals marginal benefit (measured by quasi-rent).  This is 
completely standard.  Less obvious is how equilibrium information quality changes as the 
variance of ex ante θ goes up.  A simulation study for the case in which θ is uniformly 
distributed shows the existence of a robust set of examples in which the marginal benefit 
from better information increases with the variance of θ  (the simulation exercise is 
discussed in Technical Appendix II).
13  In terms of Figure 1, this implies that the 
                                                 
12 In this example, it is clear that the variance of the conditional mean of θ is higher when 













b a than when investors 
can only tell that θ  falls on the interval  ] , [ b a  (in which case, the variance of the conditional mean 
is zero).  See technical appendix II for more on this. 
13 Actually, we have not been able to find a counterexample in which larger variance lowered the 
marginal benefit of better information.  
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marginal benefit curve shifts up as the variance of θ  increases, leading to more 
information in equilibrium.  Thus, under these circumstances, larger volatility of 
fundamentals like θ  induces better information and, consequently, larger relative price 
volatility. 
 
III.  Sudden Stops and Relative-Price Volatility:  Empirical Findings  
 
The previous section has shown that increased variance in portfolios (due, for 
example, to increased correlation among investment projects during systemic crises) 
provides an incentive for investors to acquire additional information about investment 
projects, leading to a larger response to shocks, which, in turn, introduces more volatility 
in aggregate demand and in relative prices.  In a similar fashion, it could be argued that 
an increase in the probability of experiencing a Sudden Stop due to potential balance-
sheet effects (were a Sudden Stop to materialize) implies a larger probability that asset 
returns will become more volatile, providing incentives to acquire better information and, 
as it has been argued above, to further volatility in relative prices.  With this background 
in mind, we assess whether relative price turmoil is associated with Sudden Stops and 
balance-sheet effects.    
We start our empirical analysis by reviewing statistical properties of the WPI to 
CPI ratio for a sample of 32 countries with tight links to world capital markets, 15 EMs 
and 17 developed economies, for the period 1990-2001 (see the Data Appendix for 
details).  EMs included in the sample are those tracked by JP Morgan’s Emerging Market 
Outlook, reflecting a group of countries that significantly participate in world capital  
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markets and are thus prone to Sudden Stops originated in systemic shocks to capital 
markets. 
We first compare the variance of the WPI to CPI ratio in times of systemic 
Sudden Stops vis-à-vis “tranquil” times.
 14 
15  For each of the countries in our sample that 
experienced Sudden Stops, we construct the ratio of the variance in Sudden Stop times 
relative to tranquil times.  We find that, on average, this ratio is close to 2.6 for the case 
of EMs (see Table 1), suggesting signs of substantial changes in relative price volatility 
around periods of capital flow reversals.   
We study this more closely by fitting an AR(1) process recursively to the WPI to 
CPI ratio for each country, and looking at the behavior of one-step-ahead forecast errors.  
As shown in Figure 2, we find that in many cases, one-step-ahead forecast errors 
exceeding two standard deviations coincide with Sudden Stop episodes, particularly 
around the Russian crisis of 1998.
16  The timing of exceedingly large shocks is indicative 
of higher volatility around Sudden Stops.  
This result warrants an analysis allowing for the possibility of a non-constant 
conditional variance process of the WPI to CPI ratio.  In the same vein as Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2001), and under the assumption of a stationary conditional variance process in 
                                                 
14 Cyclical components (obtained using a Hodrick-Prescott filter) are used for this analysis. 
15 The measure of Sudden Stop used here is quite similar to that in Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía 
(2004) (see their original formulation for details).  In addition to the criterion of large capital flow 
reversals exceeding two standard deviations from the mean, we request that these reversals be 
accompanied by a spike in some external aggregate measure of the cost of funds (such as the 
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) for EMs) in order to capture systemic effects. (see the 
Data Appendix for more details). 
16 The recursively estimated AR(1) coefficient is relatively stable, even under Sudden Stop 
episodes, i.e., no two-standard deviation band falls fully outside the interval defined by previous-
period two-standard deviation bands.  This ensures that no changes in the structure of the model 
are passed on to the error term.    
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relative prices, we estimate standard autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 





















      ( 1 1 )  
where pt, the cyclical component of the WPI to CPI ratio, follows an autoregressive first-
order process, ut is the disturbance term, and  2
t σ  is the conditional variance of pt, which 
follows a moving average process in the innovations 
2
t u .
17  Results widely confirm the 
presence of changes in volatility.  Figures 3a and 3b display conditional volatility for the 
period 1992-2001 in EMs and developed countries, respectively, together with Sudden 
Stop phases (indicated by areas in gray).  They suggest that Sudden Stops are in many 
cases associated with spikes in conditional volatility (which we define as a value for the 
conditional variance exceeding two standard deviations above the mean).  Based on this 
data, we construct a set of statistics shown in Table 2.  For EMs, 56 percent of Sudden 
Stops come together with spikes in volatility (either contemporaneously or up to six 
months away from a Sudden Stop phase).  For the very few developed economies that 
were subject to Sudden Stops (4 out of 18 in our sample), 60 percent of Sudden Stops are 
also associated with spikes in volatility.  These figures suggest that Sudden Stops 
typically come hand-in-hand with increasing relative price volatility.   More interestingly, 
more than 40 percent of all volatility spikes in EMs are associated with Sudden Stops.  
                                                 
17 Our modeling strategy relies on standard joint significance Lagrange multiplier tests, together 
with likelihood ratio tests, to select an appropriate ARCH specification for the conditional 
variance, which is confronted against a standard GARCH(1,1) specification based on the value of 
their likelihoods.  Whenever the GARCH(1,1) likelihood is greater than the ARCH one, we select 
the GARCH(1,1) model.  This methodology led to the specification of an ARCH process of order 
6 or lower for all countries but one, where a GARCH(1,1) process was selected.      
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This looks quite different for developed countries, where only 9 percent of the spikes are 
accompanied by Sudden Stops, indicating that Sudden Stops are not a major source of 
disruption in developed economies, but that Sudden Stops could be a significant factor 
behind increases in relative price volatility across EMs. 
We now proceed to test these results formally by making use of panel ARCH 
estimations, including 29 out of all 32 countries in our sample
18.  Our interest lies in 
identifying determinants of the conditional variance of the WPI to CPI ratio linked to 
Sudden Stops and balance-sheet effects, controlling for additional factors affecting the 
mean and variance of the WPI to CPI ratio.  The general form of the model we estimate 
is: 
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where y is (the cyclical component of) industrial production, tot represents (the 
cyclical component of) terms of trade, SS is an indicator variable of Sudden Stop defined 
along the lines of Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) (but incorporating systemic factors, 
see footnote 15), ER is an indicator variable of exchange-rate-regime flexibility, 1-ω is a 
measure of potential changes in the real exchange rate, DLD represents liability 
dollarization, and EM is an emerging market dummy.  This specification basically 
defines the WPI to CPI ratio as an autoregressive process (controlling for a measure of 
the activity level, y, and an external price, tot), where its conditional variance is affected 
                                                 
18 Data on the WPI for Australia, New Zealand, and Nigeria is not available on a monthly basis, 
so these countries were excluded from the sample.   
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by the materialization of Sudden Stops  and balance-sheet effects, as well as (the square 
of) past shocks to the mean of the WPI to CPI ratio (implying an ARCH(k) structure for 
the conditional variance).
 19 
Balance-sheet effects are captured by the interaction of two variables, one 
measuring real exchange rate changes, the other indicating the base over which valuation 
effects take place.  We use Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004)’s proxy for potential 
changes in the real exchange rate following a Sudden Stop, 1-ω , where ω is defined as 
the share of the absorption of tradable goods (Z) that can be financed with the existing 
supply of tradable goods (Y), net of factor payments (S), or ( ) Z S Y / − = ω .  The higher the 
value of 1-ω, the higher the leverage with the rest of the world, and the larger the 
unavoidable rise in the RER.
20 
  As indicated in the introduction, dollarization of the banking system is key in the 
analysis of the effects of mismatches and balance-sheet effects because bankruptcies of 
non-tradable sectors indebted in foreign currency can lead to heavy stress on banks and 
on the payments system.  Constructing a measure of loans allocated to non-tradable 
sectors in foreign currency (net of assets in foreign currency) is not possible for our 
sample size given lack of data.  Instead, we rely on a proxy using a measure of Domestic 
Liability Dollarization, or DLD.  It is defined as BIS reporting banks’ local asset 
positions in foreign currency as a share of GDP for the case of developed countries.  
Given that such data is not available for EMs, we construct a proxy for DLD by adding 
                                                 
19 All variables in the variance equation are lagged one period to reduce potential endogeneity 
problems, except for the Sudden Stop indicator, which is set contemporaneously. 
20 Given the lack of monthly national account data, we proxy our measure of (1-ω) by the ratio of 
exports over imports, assuming that exports are a good representation of the supply of tradable 
goods, and that imports are a good proxy of the absorption of tradable goods.  
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up dollar deposits
21 and bank foreign borrowing as a share of GDP, under the assumption 
that banks match their assets and liabilities by currency type, and transfer exchange rate 
risk to debtors .
22  Although this variable is not exactly a measure of mismatch because 
some of the credit in foreign currency may be allocated to tradable sectors (and some 
non-tradable sectors may possess assets in foreign currency), some recent evidence based 
on Kamil (2004) suggests that high levels of dollarization are typically accompanied by 
currency mismatches, in which case it constitutes a reasonable proxy.  Note that DLD is 
measured as a share of GDP because it better captures the potential impact of balance-
sheet effects in terms of the size of the economy, as opposed to measures that consider 
the share of dollar loans in total loans⎯measures that, although possibly high, are not 
good indicators of the size of the balance-sheet problem.   
Notice that since the second term of the right hand side of the variance equation 
(13) is non-linear, there is an implicit interaction between (1- ω) and DLD (given that the 
impact of (1-ω) on relative price volatility will depend on the level of DLD) that accounts 
for balance-sheet effects. 
Because volatility is typically higher in EMs than in developed economies due to 
differences in several other institutional factors, we include an EM dummy to capture 
these effects.  Another element to consider is that more flexible exchange rate regimes 
will typically display higher volatility of the WPI to CPI ratio.  We include Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s (2002) measure of nominal exchange rate flexibility to control for this effect.  
                                                 
21 Data on dollar deposits are mainly those from Honohan and Shi (2003); see the Data Appendix 
for a full description.   
22 See IDB (2004) for evidence on the high correlation across countries between the levels of 
domestic deposit and loan dollarization, reflecting the existence of prudential measures that limit 
net foreign exchange positions at the bank level.  
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More general specifications also control for possible effects of Sudden Stops, the 
exchange rate regime, and the interaction of Sudden Stops with potential changes in 
relative prices (1- ω) and dollarization (DLD) on the mean of the WPI to CPI ratio. 
 Estimation of system (12)-(13) requires selecting an appropriate lag length (n) for 
variables in the mean equation, as well as an appropriate lag length for the ARCH terms 
of the conditional variance.  Our strategy is to first choose lags (n) of p, y and tot in (13) 
as indicated by a Schwarz information criterion
23.  Next, we use the squared residuals 
obtained from estimation of (12) to select the appropriate lag length (k) of the ARCH 
component of (13) with the aid of LM tests and Likelihood Ratio tests.
24  This procedure 
leads to the selection of an ARCH(6) model for the conditional variance (k=6 in (13)).
25  .  
Results for the ARCH(6) model are presented in Table 3, for different specifications 
regarding the number of controls used in the mean and variance equations.  Columns 1 
and 2 show the simplest specifications (δ=ξ=0), assuming that Sudden Stops, or Sudden 
Stops interacted with potential balance-sheet effects captured by (1-ω) and DLD, have no 
significant impact on the mean equation of relative prices.  Columns 3 and 4 add the 
Sudden Stop indicator in the mean equation (δ≠0).  Columns 5 and 6 add the interaction 
of Sudden Stop and potential balance-sheet effects (ξ≠0), while columns 7 and 8 include 
                                                 
23 Departing from an “unrestricted” model for p including 6 lags of p, y and tot.  This is done for 
parsimony reasons in order to minimize noise.   
24 Departing from an “unrestricted” model for the squared residuals including 6 lags.  
25 An identification problem arises when trying to specify the lag structure of the mean equation 
and that of the conditional variance equation simultaneously.  The lag structure of the mean 
equation could be fixed first, proceeding afterwards with the identification of an appropriate lag 
structure for the conditional variance, under the assumption that the true process of the mean 
equation is known.  Alternatively, the structure of the conditional variance could be fixed first, 
proceeding afterwards with the choice of an appropriate lag structure in the mean equation, this 
time under the assumption that the true process of the variance is known.  Both approaches are 
not without caveats.  Ideally, joint identification of the appropriate lag structure of both mean and 
variance should be carried out, a task that involves maximizing the likelihood of a family of 
models with different lag lengths in mean and variance, something that we do not do here.  
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both the Sudden Stop indicator and balance-sheet effects (δ≠0, ξ≠0).  In addition, 
columns 2, 4 and 6 also capture the effects of the inclusion of the exchange rate regime in 
the conditional variance equation (π≠0).  For all specifications in Table 3, LM tests were 
run on the squared standardized residuals to check for possible remaining 
autocorrelation
26.  None were significant at the 5 percent level, providing evidence that 
ARCH effects have been appropriately captured by the ARCH(6) specification.    
A common feature across the different estimations is the significance of the 
Sudden Stop indicator variable at the 1 percent level in the conditional variance equation.  
DLD also comes up significant at the 1 percent level, with a positive coefficient.  (1-ω) is 
significant at the 10 percent level in the estimation shown in column 1, and at the 12-16 
percent level in most other specifications shown in Table 3.  Even though the inclusion of 
the Sudden Stop indicator and the balance-sheet effect measure may be justified on 
economic grounds, they do not come up significant in the mean equation (columns 3-8).  
Note that the lack of significance of these variables does not invalidate the fact that 
Sudden Stops could still have level effects on relative prices.  Because these events may, 
for example, be associated with an overshooting of the real exchange rate at the onset of a 
crisis, not necessarily implying that relative prices should remain constant at a high level 
within the Sudden Stop window, our Sudden Stop indicator need not be significant.  
However, this window is indeed relevant in defining periods of turbulence in relative 
prices, as shown by its significance in the variance equation. 
                                                 
26 Standardized squared residuals are obtained by dividing squared residuals in equation (12) by 
the estimated conditional variance (from equation (13)).  If the ARCH specification has 
appropriately captured the structure of the conditional variance, squared standardized residuals 
should display no signs of autocorrelation (see Bollerslev and Mikkelsen (1996)).  This is verified 
by running LM tests using six lags of the squared standardized residuals.         
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The fact that the Sudden Stop indicator and the balance-sheet effect variable turn 
out not to be significant in the mean equation suggests one should refer to columns 1 and 
2 when analyzing the effects of (1-ω).  Even though (1-ω) is significant at the 10 percent 
level in the estimation shown in column 1, after the inclusion of the exchange rate regime 
variable (column 2), (1-ω) is significant only at the 12 percent level.  These results 
provide some evidence for the presence of  balance-sheet effects affecting the conditional 
variance of relative prices.  Additionally, the EM dummy is significant at the 1 percent 
level, while the exchange rate regime indicator variable is significant at the 5 percent 
level across different specifications.   
Reflecting on the choice of (1-ω), we notice that previous work by Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), using yearly data, rely on the first lag of (1-ω) to account for 
balance-sheet effects, which is equivalent in our specifications to a 12-month lag.  Their 
result may be highlighting that the longer lag of (1-ω) is a better proxy for the potential 
change in the real exchange rate (following a Sudden Stop) than the first lag of (1- ω), 
which may already be showing signs of adjustment, similar to the one that would prevail 
at the time of a Sudden Stop.  For this reason, we decide to include a 12-month lag of (1-
ω) in our specifications. 
Another element of possible concern is that the high frequency nature of the series 
used for estimation may reduce the power of lagging explanatory variables one period to 
reduce possible endogeneity problems in the ARCH specifications.  For this reason (and 
the economic justification for the inclusion of a 12-month lag of (1-ω) previously stated),  
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we perform a robustness check including 12-period lags for all variables in our variance 
equation (DLD, (1-ω), and the exchange rate regime).  Results are shown in Table 4.
27   
This specification clearly states the relevance of (1-ω) in the variance equation, 
which comes up significant at the 1 or 5 percent level, depending on the specification.  
DLD also remains significant, at the 1 percent level.  These results provide stronger 
evidence in favor or the influence of balance-sheet effects in determining the conditional 
variance of the WPI to CPI ratio.  The Sudden Stop indicator also stays significant at the 
1 percent level, while the exchange rate regime is significant at the 10 percent level. 
All in all, this set of results points to the significance of Sudden Stops and 
potential balance-sheet effects in affecting the conditional variance of the WPI to CPI 
ratio.  These effects seem to be even stronger for EMs, given the impact of institutional 
differences with developed countries. 
Given these results, it is worth exploring balance-sheet effects further by 
illustrating the differences in the impact of changes in (1-ω) on the conditional variance 
of the WPI to CPI ratio, depending on the level of dollarization, everything else equal.  
Take for example two EMs whose only difference lies in their dollarization level, i.e., one 
with high DLD, and another one with low DLD.  The ratio of the derivative of (13) with 
respect to (1-ω) for the high DLD country vis-à-vis that of the low DLD country yields: 
                                                 
27 Just like before, LM tests were run for all specifications in Table 4 on their squared 
standardized residuals to check for possible remaining autocorrelation.  None were significant at 
the 5 percent level, once again providing evidence in favor of the ARCH(6) specification as an 
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Now define a high dollarization country as that belonging to the 75
th percentile in the 
DLD sample distribution, and a low dollarization country as that belonging to the 25
th 
percentile.  In this case, the ratio of derivatives described in (14) yields 1.467, indicating 
that the effect of a change of the same magnitude in (1-ω) is 46.7 percent higher for the 
high DLD country. 
  However, a much more interesting comparison arises when considering the 
effects of a change in (1- ω) on the conditional variance of the WPI to CPI ratio for the 
average EM and under Sudden Stop, vis-à-vis the average developed country with no 
Sudden Stop (the typical case for developed countries).  Assuming away differences in 

































,    (15) 
where DLD
EM is the average DLD level for EMs, DLD
DEV represents the average DLD 
level for developed countries, γ is the additional effect of being an EM, and η is the 
additional effect of a Sudden Stop.  In this case, results are much more striking.  Equation 
(15) yields a value of 6.6, i.e., the effect of a change in (1-ω) is more than six times 
bigger for the average EM under Sudden Stop than for the average developed country.  A 
question that arises naturally is how this result should be measured against the fact that  
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conditional variances are different between EMs and developed countries.  According to 
(13), the conditional variance for the average EM (evaluated at the mean of all 
explanatory variables for EMs), is 5.9 times larger than that of a developed country.
28  
Even though the conditional variance of the WPI to CPI ratio is much higher than that of 
the average developed country, balance-sheet effects due to a change in (1-ω) will still 
have a slightly larger proportional impact on the conditional variance of the EM 
economy.  
 
IV.   Conclusions 
Using a theoretical model based on information acquisition under increased 
uncertainty, we rationalize why Sudden Stops and balance-sheet effects may affect the 
variance of key relative prices such as the WPI to CPI ratio.  Increased variance (due, for 
example, to increased correlation among investment projects during Sudden Stop 
episodes) spurs investors to acquire additional information, which translates into greater 
volatility in investment decisions and in relative prices.  In a similar fashion, it can be 
argued that an increase in the probability of experiencing a Sudden Stop due to an 
increase in potential balance-sheet effects implies a larger probability that asset returns 
will become more volatile, providing incentives to acquire better information and leading 
to further volatility in relative prices. 
Casual observation of the properties of a key relative price such as the WPI to CPI 
ratio, a measure of the “domestic” real exchange rate, suggests that Sudden Stops are 
associated with increases in this ratio’s volatility.  In particular, major changes in 
                                                 
28 This time evaluating all explanatory variables at their developed-country mean values.  
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volatility are associated more than 40 percent of the time with Sudden Stops in EMs, but 
rarely so in developed countries. 
Formal empirical analysis of the determinants of the conditional variance of the 
WPI to CPI ratio under a family of ARCH specifications confirms that Sudden Stops, as 
well as potential balance-sheet effects, are highly relevant in understanding sharp 
increases in volatility.  The effects that these balance-sheet factors impinge on the 
conditional variance of the WPI to CPI ratio are consistent with our previous finding that 
balance-sheet effects affect the probability of experiencing a Sudden Stop, once 
informational aspects highlighted by our theoretical model are factored in.   In the world 
of EMs, where contingent contracts are more fiction than fact, sharp increases in relative-
price volatility during a Sudden Stop could have substantial welfare effects.         
  These results contribute to the expansion of a research program on factors 
affecting the volatility of relative prices, a key element that needs to be more widely 
understood given its relevance in the design of policies for EMs, where reduction of 
volatility and policymaking under high volatility rank at the top of the research agenda.  
  28
Technical Appendix I 
Proposition:  For θ  uniformly distributed along the interval [a,b], with b>a and a>r
29, the 
variance of the return to entrepreneurial labor under full information, relative to the 
variance of the return to entrepreneurial labor under no information is greater than 1. 
Proof:  Recalling (10) and (11) in the main text, the above mentioned ratio reduces to: 
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=       (A1)   
Given that random variable θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [a,b], its ex ante 
mean is µ = (a + b)/2, and var θ = (b – a)
2/12.  Making use of the fact that 
[] ∫ − =
x














































∫∫ θ θ θ θ
.   (A2) 
 
For any given a, the variance of θ increases as b increases. Thus, we are interested in the 
behavior of R(b) as b increases.  From (A1), for the particular case of VAR(θ )=0 (b=a, 
or  θ θ = ), it is clear that R=1.  Now consider the derivative of (A2) with respect to b.  
This yields: 
( )( )








− =         (A3) 
                                                 
29 a>r is required so that capital (k) is always positive (recall equation (6) in the main text).   
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Given that b>a and a>r, for (A3) to be positive,  0 2 > − + r b a  must hold.  Suppose not.  
Then: 
0 2 < − + r b a , or  0 < − + − r b r a .     (A4) 
But given b>a>r holds, then a-r>0 and b-r>0, so (A4) can never hold.  Therefore, (A3) 
will always be positive for b>a.  From the fundamental theorem of calculus, for any b>a, 
we know: 





ds s R ds s R a R b R ) ( ' 1 ) ( ' ) ( ) ( .     (A5) 
But given that R’(s)>0 for any b>a (and zero for b=a, recall (A3)), then R(b) will always 
be greater than 1.  
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Technical Appendix II 
We will sketch out the simulation exercise mentioned in Section III.  Let us assume that 
random variable θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [a,b].  Thus, its ex ante mean is 
µ = (a + b)/2, and var θ = (b – a)
2/12.  Under no information, the investor knows the ex 
ante distribution of θ, but nothing else about its realization.  Furthermore, under perfect 
information the investor knows the exact realization of θ.  In the simulation, however, we 
further assume that the investor can get finer information sets, indexed by n, with the 
following characteristics: consider the grid in the [a,b] interval, denoted by 
{a,a+h,a+2h,a+3h,. . .,b}, where h = (b – a)/n; having spent resources to acquire a given 
grid (i.e., a given n) the investor can tell in what section of the grid random variable θ  
has fallen.  Thus, for example, the investor may know that the realization of θ ∈ [a + (j-
1)h,a + jh], for some natural number j such that n ≥ j ≥ 1.  Armed with that information, 
thus, the investor would be able to compute the conditional expectation of θ, which we 






a n x j
− +
+ =       ( A 6 )  
All components of the grid have equal probability 1/n.  It can be verified that ex ante 
. ) ( µ = n Ex j       ( A 7 )  
In words, the unconditional expected value of x is equal to the unconditional mean of θ, 
as intuition would suggest.  Clearly, the expected value of x is independent of n.  Thus, to 
figure out how the variance of x changes with n all we need to do is to compute Exj
2(n).
30  
                                                 
30 Recall that for any random variable y, var y = Ey
2 – (Ey)
2.  In the above example, the mean of x 
is constant with respect to n.  Thus, changes in its variance with respect to n can be assessed by 
simply examining changes in Ex
2.  
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Clearly, by (A6) and recalling that h = (b – a)/n, µ = (a + b)/2 and the probability of each 
grid is 1/n, we have: 
.
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µ     (A8) 
Thus, for each a, the marginal benefit of better information, Φ(n,a), n = 1, 2, ..., n – 1, is 
obtained by computing 
). ( ) 1 ( ) , ( 2 2 n Ex n Ex a n j j − + = Φ      ( A 9 )  
Simulations show that function Φ(n,a) is downward sloping in n and a for a wide variety 
of cases (we found no counterexamples).  The relationship between Φ and n is depicted 
by the downward sloping curve in Figure 1.  Moreover, since µ = (a + b)/2, and var θ = 
(b – a)








θ       ( A 1 0 )  
Hence, since a < µ, we have that the variance of θ declines as a goes up.  Therefore, in 
view of (A9), (A10) and simulations’ results, one concludes that there exists a wide 
variety of cases in which the marginal benefit of information declines as the variance of θ  
goes down, as claimed in the text.  (Once again, no counterexample to this proposition 
was found in the simulations.)  If this is coupled with an information cost function that is 
strictly convex and increasing in n, equilibrium information quality is determined as in 
Figure 1. 
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Data Appendix 
 
Our sample of EMs consists of those countries tracked by JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Outlook (which includes the subset of countries used in 
the calculation of the EMBI+ index), i.e., EMs that significantly participate in world capital markets.  Countries with missing information on their 
monthly trade balance, or which do not report quarterly capital account information (a measure we used to check the accuracy of our monthly proxy 
in mimicking quarterly fluctuations) were dropped from the sample.  The complete list of EMs included therefore consists of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa.  Our choice 
of developed countries is dictated by OECD membership, and it includes Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA.  Data are collected on an annual basis 
unless otherwise stated. 
 
Variable  Definitions and Sources 
Capital flows proxy  Trade balance minus changes in international reserves (monthly).  All figures are expressed in 1995 
US dollars.  Source: IMF IFS.  This data is used to construct a measure of capital flow reversals (see 
Sudden Stop indicator in this appendix).  
Sudden Stop indicator  The measure of Sudden Stop used here is quite similar to that in Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) 
(see their original formulation for details).  In addition to their criterion of large capital flow 
reversals exceeding two standard deviations from the mean (for their capital flow proxy), we request 
that these reversals be accompanied by a spike in some external aggregate measure of the cost of 
funds in order to capture systemic effects.  More specifically, we use the (log of) J. P. Morgan 
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spread over US Treasury bonds for EMs, the Merrill Lynch 
Euro-area Government Index spreads for Euro-area countries (as well as Nordic countries such as 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), and G7 Government Index spreads for all remaining developed 
countries.  We construct aggregate high-spread episodes in analogous fashion to the Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) measure of large capital flow reversals (i.e., we consider spikes in 
spreads exceeding two standard deviations from the mean), and consider that a Sudden Stop occurs 
when the measure of the fall-in-capital-flows phase overlaps (on a yearly basis) with the aggregate 
high-spread phase.  Episodes that lie within a six-month interval are considered part of the same 
Sudden Stop phase (this Sudden Stop measure differs from Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) in 
that we do not use their second criterion of associated falls in GDP, and instead use the aggregate 
spread measure described above to consider systemic Sudden Stops). 
Absorption of tradable goods (Z)  Imports plus tradable output domestically consumed, proxied by the sum of agricultural and 
industrial output minus exports.  More specifically, we construct the share of tradable output in total   33
output as the ratio of agriculture plus industrial output to total GDP at constant prices.  Next, we 
multiply this share by total dollar GDP to obtain the dollar value of tradable output.  We do this in 
order to avoid excessive fluctuations in output composition due to valuation effects that are present 
in sectoral data at current prices.  Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
CAD  Current account deficit. Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
Domestic Liability Dollarization  For developed economies: BIS reporting banks’ local asset positions in foreign currency as a share 
of GDP (since data for Australia and New Zealand are not available from this source, we used data 
from their respective Central Banks). For emerging economies: dollar deposits obtained from 
Honohan and Shi (2002) (and complemented with data from Central Banks for the cases of 
Colombia, Korea, Brazil) plus bank foreign borrowing (IMF IFS banking institutions line 26c) as a 
share of GDP.  GDP data was obtained from IMF’s  WEO database.  
TOT   We used the ratio of the monthly unit value of exports to the unit value of imports. Both series were 
obtained mainly from the IMF IFS Database.  Missing data was completed using official sources 
(Central Bank databases).  
Ex. Regime RR.  Monthly 5-way exchange regime classification. Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). 
CPI  Consumer Price Index. Source: IMF IFS 
WPI  Wholesale Price Index. Source: IMF IFS 
Ind. Production  Industrial Production Index (seasonally adjusted). Source: IMF IFS.   34
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
One-Step ahead Forecast Error  

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Gray areas indicate Sudden Stop periods. Bands indicate +/- two standard deviations of the 
forecast error.   38
 Figure 3a 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The plotted conditional volatilities are the fitted values for 
2
t σ  in the system of equations 
defined in (11) in the main text. Thresholds represent two standard deviations above the mean of 
the fitted conditional variance (
2 ˆt σ ). Gray areas indicate Sudden Stop periods. Nigeria is not 
included due to lack of data on WPI.     39
Figure 3b 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The plotted conditional volatilities are the fitted values for 
2
t σ  in the system of equations 
defined in (11) in the main text. Thresholds represent two standard deviations above the mean of 
the fitted conditional variance (
2 ˆt σ ).   Gray areas indicate Sudden Stop periods. Australia and 
New Zealand are not included due to lack of data on WPI.  A non-constant variance specification 
could not be fit to data for Finland and Sweden.  40
 
Table 1 
WPI to CPI ratio Volatility during Sudden Stops episodes vis-à-vis tranquil times 
 
 
Emerging Markets   
 - Variance in Sudden Stops / variance in tranquil times  2.57 
 - Variance in Sudden Stops ±  6 month neighborhood / variance in tranquil times
1/  4.08 
Developed Economies   
 - Variance in Sudden Stops / variance in tranquil times  1.65 
 - Variance in Sudden Stops ± 6 month neighborhood/ variance in tranquil times






Spikes in the WPI/CPI Volatility and Sudden Stops 
 
 




Sudden Stops associated with Spikes in WPI/CPI Volatility     
 - Contemporaneously   39%  40% 
 - In the neighborhood of a SS episode 
 1/  17%  20% 
Sudden Stops not associated with Spikes in WPI/CPI Volatility  44%  40% 








Spikes in WPI/CPI Volatility associated with Sudden Stops       
 - Contemporaneously   26%  6% 
 - In the neighborhood of a SS episode 
 1/  15%  3% 
Spikes in WPI/CPI Volatility not associated with Sudden Stops  59%  91% 
Total of Spikes in WPI/CPI Volatility  27  35 
 
1/ A Sudden Stop neighborhood is composed of two additional windows that include six months 
previous to a Sudden Stop episode, and six months after a Sudden Stop episode.   41
Table 3 
 Panel ARCH(6) Specification of the WPI to CPI Ratio  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MEAN EQUATION 
Constant  -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 -0.019 -0.020 
  (0.007)**  (0.008)**  (0.008)** (0.008)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)*** (0.008)** (0.008)*** 
WPI/CPI (t-1)  1.093 1.096 1.094 1.097 1.094 1.097 1.093 1.096 
  (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
ToT (t-1)  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ind. Production (t-1)  0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
WPI/CPI (t-2)  -0.249 -0.251 -0.250 -0.252 -0.250 -0.252 -0.249 -0.251 
  (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** 
ToT (t-2)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ind. Production (t-2)  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
ToT  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.002)***  (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Sudden  Stop     0.025  0.025    -0.027  -0.025 
     (0.035)  (0.035)    (0.053)  (0.053) 
Balance sheet effect          0.487  0.469  0.654  0.627 
       (0.360)  (0.364)  (0.528)  (0.539) 
VARIANCE EQUATION 
Constant  -3.550 -3.057 -3.541 -3.049 -3.524 -3.033 -3.523 -3.031 
  (0.316)*** (0.359)*** (0.319)*** (0.362)*** (0.317)*** (0.359)*** (0.323)*** (0.362)*** 
EM  dummy  0.610 0.606 0.605 0.601 0.608 0.604 0.613 0.608 
  (0.125)*** (0.125)*** (0.125)*** (0.125)*** (0.125)*** (0.125)*** (0.125)*** (0.125)*** 
DLD(t-1)  3.701 3.867 3.722 3.893 3.645 3.818 3.602 3.773 
  (0.703)*** (0.708)*** (0.715)*** (0.721)*** (0.716)*** (0.719)*** (0.738)*** (0.743)*** 
(1-ω ) (t-1)  0.472 0.432 0.464 0.423 0.450 0.407 0.450 0.406 
  (0.286)*  (0.283) (0.289) (0.286) (0.287) (0.284) (0.291) (0.289) 
Sudden  Stop  0.769 0.763 0.750 0.743 0.756 0.748 0.768 0.761 
  (0.157)*** (0.156)*** (0.173)*** (0.174)*** (0.161)*** (0.161)*** (0.170)*** (0.170)*** 
Ex. Regime RR (t-1)   -0.129  -0.129  -0.128  -0.128 
   (0.050)**  (0.050)**  (0.051)**  (0.051)** 
ARCH(1)  0.260 0.259 0.261 0.260 0.259 0.258 0.258 0.257 
  (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** 
ARCH(2)  0.234 0.231 0.233 0.231 0.233 0.231 0.234 0.231 
  (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 
ARCH(3)  0.135 0.137 0.135 0.137 0.136 0.138 0.136 0.138 
  (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** 
ARCH(4)  0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.190 0.190 0.191 0.190 
  (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
ARCH(5)  0.031 0.025 0.031 0.025 0.030 0.024 0.029 0.024 
  (0.016)**  (0.015)  (0.016)**  (0.015)*  (0.016)* (0.015) (0.015)* (0.015) 
ARCH(6)  0.066 0.070 0.066 0.070 0.067 0.071 0.068 0.072 
  (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Note:  Panel ARCH is estimated using an unbalanced sample of 29 countries for the period 1992-
2001. Note that the first two years of observations (1990-1991) are lost, given that such 
information is used to construct initial standard deviations to make a judgment on the size of 
capital flow reversals.  See Data appendix for definitions of variables and data sources. The 
estimated system is described in equations (12) and (13) in the main text.   42
Table 4 
Panel ARCH(6) Specification of the WPI to CPI Ratio 
(12-month lags in variance equation) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MEAN EQUATION 
Constant  -0.018 -0.017 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 
  (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
WPI/CPI (t-1)  1.089 1.090 1.089 1.091 1.089 1.090 1.089 1.091 
  (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
ToT (t-1)  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ind. Production (t-1)  0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
WPI/CPI (t-2)  -0.246 -0.245 -0.247 -0.246 -0.246 -0.246 -0.247 -0.246 
  (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** 
ToT (t-2)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ind. Production (t-2)  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ToT  -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Sudden  Stop     0.035  0.042    0.035  0.036 
     (0.039)  (0.040)    (0.071)  (0.070) 
Balance sheet effect          0.260  0.357  -0.007  0.087 
       (0.347)  (0.372)  (0.625)  (0.634) 
VARIANCE EQUATION 
Constant  -3.847 -3.479 -3.874 -3.483 -3.901 -3.517 -3.872 -3.492 
  (0.310)*** (0.398)*** (0.320)*** (0.398)*** (0.314)*** (0.398)*** (0.321)*** (0.399)*** 
EM  dummy  0.731 0.723 0.730 0.721 0.739 0.733 0.730 0.723 
  (0.125)*** (0.126)*** (0.125)*** (0.126)*** (0.126)*** (0.127)*** (0.126)*** (0.127)*** 
DLD(t-12)  3.041 3.105 3.073 3.149 3.023 3.073 3.074 3.136 
  (0.722)*** (0.729)*** (0.752)*** (0.762)*** (0.726)*** (0.737)*** (0.783)*** (0.794)*** 
(1-ϖ ) (t-12)  0.735 0.659 0.758 0.678 0.786 0.711 0.757 0.688 
  (0.278)*** (0.292)** (0.285)*** (0.295)** (0.283)*** (0.293)** (0.288)*** (0.295)** 
Sudden  Stop  0.892 0.916 0.880 0.896 0.914 0.939 0.879 0.905 
  (0.157)*** (0.155)*** (0.169)*** (0.170)*** (0.155)*** (0.152)*** (0.202)*** (0.200)*** 
Ex. Regime RR (t-12)  -0.085  -0.091  -0.090  -0.091 
   (0.046)*  (0.048)*  (0.046)*  (0.048)* 
ARCH(1)  0.256 0.258 0.258 0.260 0.256 0.258 0.258 0.260 
  (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** 
ARCH(2)  0.220 0.220 0.220 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.220 0.219 
  (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 
ARCH(3)  0.143 0.144 0.143 0.145 0.143 0.145 0.143 0.145 
  (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.020)*** 
ARCH(4)  0.185 0.185 0.184 0.184 0.185 0.185 0.184 0.184 
  (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
ARCH(5)  0.033 0.028 0.033 0.028 0.033 0.027 0.033 0.028 
  (0.015)** (0.015)* (0.015)** (0.015)* (0.015)** (0.015)* (0.016)** (0.015)* 
ARCH(6)  0.088 0.091 0.088 0.092 0.089 0.093 0.088 0.092 
  (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Note:  Panel ARCH is estimated using an unbalanced sample of 29 countries for the period 1992-
2001. Note that the first two years of observations (1990-1991) are lost, given that such 
information is used to construct initial standard deviations to make a judgment on the size of 
capital flow reversals.  See Data appendix for definitions of variables and data sources. The 
estimated system is described in equations (12) and (13) in the main text. In contrast to Table 3, 
Domestic Liability Dollarization (DLD), the indicator of potential change in relative prices (1-ϖ ) 
and the Exchange Rate Regime variable (Ex. Regime RR) are lagged 12 periods in the variance 
equation. 
  